

Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

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O P 281715Z OCT 73

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2408

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5191

EXDIS

SECSTATE PASS SECDEF FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION ALSO TAKE FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12/31/81

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJ: THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

SUMMARY: THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS WHILE BEING SUCCESSFULLY EASED, HAS LED TO MUTUAL RECRIMINATION - PUBLIC AS WELL AS PRIVATE - WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES WHICH, IF NOT DEESCALATED, COULD DO SERIOUS AND POSSIBLY LASTING DAMAGE TO U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE. THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE AND THE VARIOUS NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE EUROPEAN NATIONS TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST AND TOWARDS INTERESTS IN THE REGION DIFFER. THE US, VIEWING THE CRISIS AS AN EAST-WEST COMPETITION THREATENING DETENTE, ASSERTED THAT SECURITY AND DETENTE WERE INDIVISIBLE; WHILE THERE IS NO EUROPEAN VIEW AS SUCH, SOME EUROPEAN ALLIES SEEING THE CONFLICT AS THE LATEST RESURGENCE OF THE ARAB/ISRAELI STRUGGLE AND ANXIOUS ABOUT OIL SUPPLIES, WERE NOT FULLY PERSUADED OF THE US VIEW OF THE FULL GLOBAL ASPECT OF THE SOVIET THREAT. IN THOSE CASES, EITHER THEY WERE UNABLE TO GRASP IT, OR THEY LACKED THE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO SEE IT AS WE DID. CLEARLY SOME WERE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT THE US INTERPRETATION

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ON FAITH ALONE. BY CEASING TO CRITICIZE THE BEHAVIOR OF THE ALLIES, IN A WAY THAT SUGGESTS THEY ARE A MONOLITH - WHICH THEY ARE NOT-, BY UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL REALITIES FACED BY A NUMBER OF INSECURE BUT FRIENDLY ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, AND BY PROVIDING A

PERSUASIVE EXPLANATION OF US ACTIONS, WE CAN BUILD GREATER COHESION IN SUPPORT OF PRESENT AND FUTURE US ACTIONS. ACTION REQUESTED: INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE EARLY THIS WEEK. END SUMMARY.

1. AS A RESULT OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, AND DSPITE THE SUCCESS OF U.S. ACTION THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES ARE IN A SITUATION WHERE EACH SIDE IS DECLARING ITSELF THE VICTIM OF SHABBY TREATMENT. FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, AND WITH ADMITTEDLY INCOMPLETE INFORMATION, IT APPEARS THAT THE PROBLEM BEGAN WITH DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF ALLIANCE AND NATIONAL INTERESTS RELATED TO THE MIDDLE EAST, INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF OIL SUPPLIES. IT WAS FED, FROM THEIR STANDPOINT, BY FACT THAT US DID NOT SUPPLY RESPONSES TO THEIR MANY QUESTIONS AND REQUESTS; AND FROM OURS, BY WHAT WE SAW AS THEIR UNRESPONSIVENESS. IT WAS IGNITED BY THEIR IRRITATION AND POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT ON THE LACK OF NOTIFICATION OF THE ALERT OF US FORCES ON THEIR SOIL, UNTIL MANY HOURS AFTER IT WAS PUBLICLY KNOWN. THE US HAS NOT EMPLOYED THE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION PROCESS TO BEST EFFECT TO PROVIDE TIMELY NITIFICATION, TO EXPLAIN ITS POLICIES PERSUASIVELY AND RESPONSIVELY, TO BUILD ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICIES AND TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER US INITIATIVES REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST.

2. IF MUTUAL RECRIMINATIONS CONTINUE AND FURTHER EXACERBATE RELATIONS AND SOLIDARITY AMONG THE ALLIES, THERE CAN BE SERIOUS AND POSSIBLY LASTING DAMAGE TO US INTERESTS IN EUROPE. NOT THE LEAST OF THE DANGERS IS THAT THE SITUATION PRESENTS OPTIONS FOR THE USSR TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF INJURED NATIONAL FEELINGS IN WESTERN EUROPE, OF THE COALESCING EFFECT AGAINST THE US OF THE RECENT US BLANKET CRITICISM OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND OF THE APPREHENSION CAUSED BY THE US ANNOUNCEMENT OF A REASSESSMENT. USING ELEMENTS UNFRIENDLY TO THE US AND NATO IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES AS A CAT'S-PAW, THEY MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO AGAIN EMPLOY SIMILAR ADVENTURIST TACTICS.

3. TOP ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN HAVE PUBLICLY RECORDED THE DISPLEASURE OF OUR GOVERNMENT WITH THE CONDUCT OF OUR ALLIES DURING THE CURRENT CRISIS. I AM UNAWARE OF EXPLICIT US BILATERAL
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REQUESTS TO ITS ALLIES TO ADOPT OR REFRAIN FROM TAKING SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION. THERE WAS, AS WASHINGTON WILL HAVE NOTED, A POSITIVE GENERAL RESPONSE TO THE GENERAL REQUESTS THE US MADE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL. SPECIFICALLY, WHEN WE ASKED OUR ALLIES TO POINT OUT TO THE SOVIETS THE DANGERS TO DETENTE STEMMING FROM SOVIET ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, SEVERAL ALLIES SO BEFORE BEING ASKED.

4. I HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT OUR ALLIES HAVE REPEATEDLY PRESSED ME FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT OUR POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH THEY MIGHT RELAY TO THEIR CAPITALS TO CONVINCE THEIR GOVERNMENTS OF THE CORRECTNESS OF THE US JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER. THE ALLIES (WITH THE ALMOST

SOLITARY EXCEPTION OF FRANCE) ARE NOT UNWILLING TO FOLLOW THE US LEAD; BUT THEIR GOVERNMENTS REQUIRE THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR OUR POLICIES BUTTRESSED BY SOME FACTS WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO REACH DECISIONS AND TAKE ACTIONS THAT THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS CAN THEN JUSTIFY TO THEIR OWN PARLIAMENTS, THEIR FREE PRESSES, AND THEIR VOTERS.

5. I PROPOSE THAT WE NOW BEGIN TO RESTORE THE UTILITY OF THE ALLIANCE AS A TOOL OF US POLICY. AS A FIRST STEP, ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN SHOULD NO LONGER LEVEL CRITICISM AT "EUROPEAN ALLIES" OR "NATO ALLIES" AS THOUGH THEY WERE A UNIT. OUR ALLIES ARE FOR THE MOST PART SMALL INDIVIDUAL NATION STATES WHOSE POLICIES AND BEHAVIOR VARIED WIDELY IN RECENT WEEKS. AND EACH IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO DIFFERENT PRESSURES AND INDUCEMENTS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND ITS CORRIDORS. I WOULD SUGGEST CONFIDENTIAL DIPLOMATIC MOVES AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY AND PERHAPS THE ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH US CRITICISM OF THE BEHAVIOR OF RELUCTANT ALLIES. CONTINUATION OF THE PRESENT APPROACH COULD INDUCE SEVERAL ALLIES TO DRIFT TOWARDS FRENCH POSITION.

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ACTION SS-30

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O P 281715Z OCT 73

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2409

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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

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SECSTATE PASS SECDEF FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION ALSO TAKE FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION

6. I ASK THAT THE DEPARTMENT PROVIDE THE RELEVANT INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED AND CURRENT FACTS AND RATIONALE THAT WILL ENABLE ME TO EXPLAIN THE COUNCIL US ACTIONS DURING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, AND WHY THEY WARRANT SOLID ALLIED SUPPORT. (SEE USNATO 5184, 5179, 5133, 5049, AND 5038). SEVERAL ALLIES, BUT MOST INSISTENTLY FRANCE, HAVE RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR BILATERAL DEALINGS WITH THE USSR, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE APPLICABIL-

ITY AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR. THESE QUESTIONS ARE NOT GOING TO GO AWAY. THE US SHOULD IN COUNCIL PROVIDE SOME ANSWER TO THOSE QUESTIONS. FURTHER, ANY SPECIFIC INFORMATION WHICH CAN BE USED WITH SPECIFIC NATIONS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

7. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, NO ONE CAN DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE US WILL ASK ITS ALLIES FOR FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS OF SOLIDARITY WITH REGARD TO THE MIDDLE EAST. THE US SHOULD NOW CREATE THE BASIS FOR SUCH LATER REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT. WHENEVER THE US COMES TO THE COUNCIL AND SERIOUSLY EXPECTS TO RECEIVE SUPPORT FOR ITS REQUESTS, IT SHOULD ATTEMPT TO PROVIDE ON A
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TIMELY BASIS: 1) A CLEAR STATEMENT OF US POLICY OBJECTIVES;
2) SOME FACTUAL DATA; 3) SOME OF THE ANALYSIS THAT LED US TO ADOPT A GIVEN COURSE OF ACTION; 4) A PRECISE DESCRIPTION OF WHAT WE EXPECT THE ALLIES TO DO SINGLY AND/OR COLLECTIVELY, -- WHY, AND WITHIN WHAT LIMITS.

8. I REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE EARLY THIS WEEK (COUNCIL MEETINGS, MONDAY OCTOBER 29 AND WEDNESDAY OCTOBER 31). RUMSFELD

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